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 Over several years, the European Union (EU) has gradually developed its legal framework to assist in 
 the proper application of Union environmental protection rules, both at Member State as well as EU 
 institutional levels. This article focuses on one particular and relatively recent emerging element of that 
 supranational framework, namely the range of EU secondary legislative measures and provisions 
 concerning the management of environmental inspections. In addition to appraising the extent of Union 
 legislative engagement in relation to environmental inspections, it also reflects on certain challenges of 
 a constitutional nature that the EU will need to address in the future if its intervention in this particular 
 policy field continues to develop. 
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A significant long-standing and well-known challenge to the authority of European Union 
(EU) environmental law has been how best to enhance the relatively poor state of 
implementation of its norms in the UnionÕs Member States. Reports over the years from 





Commission1 and the European Environment Agency (EEA)2 have repeatedly shown that EU 
Member States, who are made chiefly responsible for the implementation of Union 
environmental policy at national level under the UnionÕs principal foundational treaties of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU),3 have on 
many occasions fallen short when it comes to securing the proper application of their EU 
environmental statutory responsibilities. The EU network of environmental authorities known 
as ÔIMPELÕ4 has recently reported its concerns regarding the wide variation in the quality and 
effectiveness of national competent authority structures across the EU Member States in the 
environmental sector.5  Problems concerning the state of implementation of EU 
environmental law have also been the subject of substantial and long-standing academic 
commentary.6 This article focuses on one particular area of implementation of EU 
environmental protection rules, namely, inspection controls. It assesses and reflects upon the 
extent to which the EU has developed a supranational legal framework concerning the 
management of environmental inspections for the purpose of assisting in overseeing 
compliance with EU environmental legislation. 
																																																													
1 For example, annual reports completed by the European Commission monitoring compliance with Union 
environmental law confirmed that between 2002-2013 the environmental sector constituted the largest 
proportion of infringement actions pursued by the Commission in all but one of those years: see analysis by M. 
Hedemann-Robinson, Enforcement of European Union Environmental Law: Legal Issues and Challenges 2nd 
ed (Routledge, 2015) at pp247-248. (European Commission annual monitoring reports are available for 
inspection at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/annual-
reports/index_en.htm). In its 2011 study on implementation of EU environmental legislation for the European 
Commission, the Danish  environmental consultancy COWI estimated that the annual cost of non-
implementation of the EUÕs environmental acquis amounted to some !50bn (COWI The Costs of not 
implementing the environmental acquis (September 2011) - Final Report (ENV.G.1/FRA/2006/0073): available 
for inspection at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/economics_policy/pdf/report_sept2011.pdf).  
2 For example, in 2014 the EEA reported that in the region of 21%, 14 % and 8% of the EU-28 urban population 
resides in areas where the exposure to particular matter (PM10), ozone (O2) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2) 
exceeds maximum EU limit values: see EEA Report No5/2014 Air quality in Europe Ñ 2014 report, 
19.11.2014 (ISSN 1725-9177) (Report available for inspection at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/air-
quality-in-europe-2014). 
3 See Art.192(4) TFEU, which stipulates that Ôwithout prejudice to certain measures adopted by the Union, 
Member States shall [...] implement the environment policyÕ. See also the general obligations of Member States 
set down by the TEU and TFEU on implementing EU law: Art.4 (3) TEU and Arts.197 (1) and 291(1) TFEU. 
4 EU Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law: http://impel.eu/ 
5 IMPEL Final Report Challenges in the Practical Implementation of EU Environmental Law and how IMPEL 
could help overcome them, 23.3.2015. A 2009 IMPEL study assessed that in the region of 19% of transboundary 
waste shipments in the Union were illegal: ESWI Consortium (2009) IMPEL-TFS Enforcement Actions II 
Enforcement of EU waste Shipment Regulation ÒLearning by DoingÓ, Interim Project Report (12.10.2009). (All  
reports are available for inspection on the IMPEL website: http://impel.eu). 
6 See e.g. L. Borzsk, The Impact of Environmental Concerns on the Public Enforcement Mechanism  under EU 
Law: Environmental Protection in the 25
th
 Hour (2011, Kluwer); P. Davies, EU Environmental Law: A 
Introduction to Selected Issues (Ashgate, 2004);  M. Hedemann-Robinson  (2015)  n.1 above; M. Hedemann-
Robinson, ÔEnforcement of EU Environmental Law: Taking Stock of the Evolving Union Legal FrameworkÕ 
(2015) European Energy and Environmental Law (forthcoming); L. Krmer, EU Environmental Law 7th ed. ( 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), K. Lenaerts & J. Gutierrez-Fons, ÔThe General System of EU Environmental law 





Inspection systems constitute an integral and vital part of regulatory frameworks constructed 
for the purpose of overseeing compliance with minimum standards of conduct prescribed by 
public law. As noted generally by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Ôuncovering undesirable 
behaviour through detection is a first step in regulatory enforcementÕ.7 Environmental 
regulation is no different in this respect. The establishment of an efficient system of 
inspection controls is crucial for regulators to be in a position to supervise compliance with 
environmental protection rules effectively.  For several years, though, the quality and 
effectiveness of national environmental inspectorate systems across the EU has varied 
considerably, which undermines of the uniformity of application as well as integrity of EU 
environmental legislative commitments. Whilst the Union was initially reluctant to intervene 
in areas concerned with national administrative supervision of EU environmental policy, over 
time this stance has changed considerably. A range of EU legislative measures have been 
adopted, principally since the early 2000s, with a view to involving the Union more closely in 
supervising the way in which the implementation of EU environmental law is administered at 
national level, including in the area of inspections. Most recently, the adoption of the UnionÕs 
Seventh Environment Action Programme 2013-2020 (EAP7) has placed the issue of EU level 
engagement in environmental inspections into the political foreground by virtue of a specific 
commitment to introduce Ôbinding criteriaÕ for effective Member State inspections as well as 
development of inspection support capacity at Union level.8 This political stimulus injected 
by EAP7 follows on from a series of relatively recent EU environmental legislative 
instruments that contain minimum inspection standards. Such measures have been, though, 
politically controversial amongst several Member State governments keen to reserve 
implementation tasks as far as possible as matters of national sovereign competence. The 
policy area of environmental inspections remains a heavily contested terrain from an EU 
constitutional perspective, in which the balance of power and responsibilities between EU 
federal and national levels has yet to be settled with adequate clarity or certainty. 
 
In exploring the UnionÕs engagement with the subject of environmental inspections 
management, this article is divided into two principal parts. Section 2 focuses in detail on the 
extent to which specific EU measures have been introduced to enhance systems of 
																																																													
7 R. Baldwin, M. Cave & M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory Strategy and Practice 2nd ed. (OUP, 
2012) at p228. 
8 Paragraph 65(iii) of Annex to Decision 1386/2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 
2020 ÔLiving well, within the limits of our planetÕ [2013] OJ L354/171. 
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environmental inspection, both in terms of inspections carried out by national authorities as 
well as by Union bodies. In addition, it considers the potential impact of EAP7, taking into 
account the most recent EU institutional involvement in policy development on inspections. 
Section 3 places the issue of an emerging EU inspections policy in a broader regulatory 
context. It reflects upon the political and legal challenges that are liable to affect the degree to 
which future EU level intervention in this area may be readily accommodated within the 
current system of decentralized administration of EU environmental law. It takes into account 
certain new constraints on Union competence to intervene in implementation issues 
introduced by virtue of the amendments of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty9 to the UnionÕs 
foundational legal architecture.10 These concern recent EU treaty changes regarding the 
application of the subsidiarity principle as well as new Treaty provisions concerning 
administrative co-operation with Member State authorities. The final part to this article offers 
concluding remarks on the nature and state of legal evolution concerning Union policy 
involvement in environmental inspection matters. 
 
 
2. ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTIONS AND EU LAW 
The area of environmental inspections is a policy topic that the EU has only relatively 
recently begun to address in some degree of earnest. There have been long-standing concerns 
about the effectiveness of a number of environmental inspectorate systems in several Member 
States. Varies studies (such as those sponsored by the European Commission11 or undertaken 
by IMPEL12) have revealed or otherwise confirmed widely differing types and quality of 
environmental inspection systems across Member States. Differences are often marked in 
terms of resourcing, number of agencies involved as well as supervision strategies employed. 
Environmental inspection is a key element in the law enforcement toolbox, not least given its 
																																																													
9 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C306/1. 
10 As composed of the TEU and TFEU, consolidated versions of which have been published in the EU Official 
Journal [2012] OJ C326/13-390. See also: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/treaties.html. 
11 See e.g. COWI/ECORYS/CE Impact assessment study into possible options for revising Recommendation 
2001/331 providing for minimum criteria for environmental inspections - Final Report for the European 
Commission (2011) (ENV.G.1/FRA/2006/0073); IEEP/BIOIS/ECOLOGIC, Study on inspection requirements 
for waste shipments Ð Final Report for the European Commission (ENV G.4/FRA/2007/0067). 
12 See e.g. 2003 report of the IMPEL Secretariat Short overview of the organisation of inspection in the EU 
Member States, Norway and acceding and candidate countries. See also IMPEL reports on inspections 
regarding waste shipments: Seaport Projects I-II (2003-6), Verification of Waste Destinations Projects I (2003-




preventative dimension in assisting in efforts to minimise instances of non-compliance 
arising. 
 
Owing to political resistance and sensitivities on the part of several Member States, EU 
engagement in the subject of inspections proceeded rather tentatively initially. In a 1996 
Communication on implementation of EU Law,13 the European Commission proposed that 
common guidelines be developed for national inspectorate systems. In response, the Council 
of the EU in a 1997 resolution14invited the Commission to propose guidelines on the basis of 
work carried out by IMPEL. The decision to place IMPEL as a pivotal player in the 
construction of EU policy in this area meant, at least initially, that emergent common 
guidance would essentially lean towards an intergovernmental and consensual approach, one 
based on voluntary participation and non-binding recommendations. The work on common 




2.1. Recommendation 2001/331 on Minimum Criteria for Environmental 
   Inspections (RMCEI) 
Under the aegis of the UnionÕs Sixth Environment Action Programme15 (EAP6) (2001-2012) 
the EU adopted a non-binding soft law instrument on national environmental inspection 
systems, namely Recommendation 2001/33116 providing for minimum criteria for 
environmental inspections (RMCEI). The aim of the RMCEI, which is still in force, is to 
improve the level of effectiveness of Member State inspectorate systems for both 
environmental protection reasons as well as reasons concerned with distortion of 
competition17within the single market. The material scope of the RMCEI is limited and 
focuses principally on the industrial emissions sector. It covers the activities of installations 
whose air emissions, water discharges or waste management activities are subject to 
																																																													
13COM(96)500 Commission Communication Implementing Community Environmental Law, 22.10.1996.  
14Council Resolution of 7 October 1997 on the drafting, implementation and enforcement of Community 
environmental law [1997] OJ C321/1. 
15Decision 1600/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2002 laying down the Sixth 
Community Environment Action Programme [2002] OJ L242/1. 
16Recommendation 2001/331 providing for minimum criteria of environmental inspections in the Member 
States [2001] OJ L118/41 (RMCEI). Recommendations are non-binding measures under EU law: see Art.288(5) 
TFEU. 
17Namely, to ensure that market operators are subject to commensurate levels of scrutiny and accompanying 
costs for the purpose of EU environmental law compliance irrespective of their location within the Union. 
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authorisation, permit or licensing requirements under EU law,18 namely integrated pollution 
prevention and control as now regulated primarily by the Industrial Emissions Directive 
2010/75.19 The RMCEI stipulates that Member States should observe a range of minimum 
criteria regarding the planning of inspections,20 organisation of routine and non-routine site 
visits,21 investigations into suspected serious breaches,22 as well as filing reports on and 
evaluating next steps with respect to site visits.23It constitutes an important milestone for EU 
policy on environmental inspections and establishes some core benchmarks for national 
inspectorate systems.  
 
In 2007 the Commission undertook a review24 of the effectiveness of the RMCEI, a process 
foreseen in the instrument.25 A number of significant shortcomings were identified. Several 
Member States had failed to implement its requirements by the 2002 deadline set in the 
recommendation.26 The Commission reported that implementation of the instrument was 
unclear or partially complete in most Member States, with only five countries27 assessed as 
having reached a high levelÕ of implementation.28 A notable shortcoming was the fact that the 
criteria identified in the RMCEI regarding inspection plan coverage had not been 
implemented in several Member States, so that many plans omitted to provide for strategic 
elements. The Commission also found that the material scope of the soft law instrument was 
too narrow, in having excluded a range of activities and sectors with significant impacts that 
were also subject to EU environmental legislative controls (such as the areas of wildlife 
hunting and trade, habitat conservation, chemical use and transboundary waste shipment). It 
also noted in the 2007 review that various terms in the RMCEI had been interpreted 
differently by Member States, which had led to significant divergence in national 
implementation strategies. For instance, it reported that some Member States considered the 
term ÔinspectionÕ meant only direct controls at installations, in contrast with the 
																																																													
18 Paragraph II (1)(a) RMCEI. 
19  Directive 2010/75 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (recast) [2010] OJ 
L334/17 which has succeeded the earlier IPPC legislation, namely former IPPC Directive 96/61[1996] OJ 
L257/26 as previously consolidated by Directive 2008/1 [2008] L24/8. 
20Paragraph IV RMCEI. 
21Paragraph V RMCEI.	
22Paragraph VII RMCEI.	
23Paragraph VI RMCEI. 
24 SEC (2007)1493 Commission Report on implementation of Recommendation 2001/331 providing for 
minimum criteria for environmental inspections, 14.11.2007.  
25 Paragraph IX RMCEI.	
26Paragraph X RMCEI.	
27 Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. 
28 See p 20 of SEC (2007)1493, n.24 above. 
7	
	
recommendationÕs broader conceptualisation of the term to include effectively any activity 
aiming to promote compliance of installations with EU environmental requirements.29 There 
was also some degree of confusion over the meaning of the undefined concept of Ôinspection 
planÕ contained in the RMCEI. Some Member States considered that a plan simply amounted 
to a list of installations to be inspected over time, as opposed to the CommissionÕs and other 
Member StatesÕ understanding that this term should mean a strategic document drawn up for 
the purpose of determining inspection priorities.  Information supplied by Member States to 
the Commission about their implementation of the RMCEI was not always comparable, 
making it difficult at times for the latter to assess the relative quality and effectiveness of 
Member StatesÕ implementation of the instrument. The Commission decided to aim for a 
revision of the RMCEI coupled with steps to introduce targeted binding minimum inspection 
standards through sectoral legislation. It was somewhat surprising that the Commission 
initially rejected the idea of using a legally binding instrument to succeed the RMCEI, given 
that it was reasonable to conclude that the poor state of implementation of the 
recommendation identified in the CommissionÕs 2007 review was in substantial part due to 
its soft, non-binding legal status. 
  
2.2.  Sectoral EU environmental legislation on inspections 
In parallel with the adoption of the general horizontal framework instrument of the RMCEI, 
the EU has steadily built up a range of sectoral legislative provisions in relation to minimum 
standards on environmental inspections carried out by national competent authorities. The 
following environmental sectors are now subject to minimum inspection obligations under 
EU legislation: industrial emissions,30 major accident hazards involving dangerous 
substances,31waste management,32 ozone depleting substance management,33geological 
storage of carbon,34scientific experimentation on animals,35the civil nuclear industry36as well 
																																																													
29 See Paragraph II.2 RMCEI. 
30 Directive 2010/75 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (recast) [2010] OJ 
L334/17. 
31Directive 2012/18 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and 
subsequently repealing Directive 96/82 [2012] OJ L197/1 (ÔSeveso IIIÕ). 
32Directive 2008/98 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ 2008 L312/3), Directive 1999/31 on the 
landfill of waste [1999] OJ L182/1,  Directive 2006/21 on the management of waste from extractive industries 
and amending Directive 2004/35 [2006] OJ L102/15,  Directive 2012/19 on waste electrical and electronic 
equipment (WEEE) (recast) [2012] OJ L197/38 and Regulation 660/2014 amending Regulation 1013/2006 on 
shipments of waste [2014] OJ L189/135. 
33 Regulation 1005/2009 on substances that deplete the ozone layer (recast) [2009] OJ L286/1. 
34 Directive 2009/31 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending various Directives [2009] OJ 
L140/114. 
35Directive 2010/63 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes [2010] OJ L276/33.  
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as the common fisheries policy (CFP).37 The Union has also established some distinct audit 
and inspection control frameworks in relation to particular areas of EU climate policy, 
specifically in relation to the sectors concerning greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading as 
well as carbon dioxide (CO") emissions from shipping. These particular monitoring controls 
in the climate policy sector, underpinned by EU secondary legislation, do not centre or focus 
directly on national competent authority engagement in inspections and are accordingly 
considered separately at the end of this section.  
 
The EU legislative provisions on environmental inspections carried out by national 
competent authorities vary in detail and stringency. This is partly a result of tailoring 
according to the perceived requirements for an individual sector and partly a result of timing. 
The earliest generation of instruments with provisions concerning inspections tended to 
contain relatively general and brief clauses on inspection standards, indicative of a preference 
on the part of the EU legislature to defer essentially to Member States over detailed 
operational requirements of national inspectorate systems. A notable example is EUÕs Waste 
Framework Directive,38 which contains but a few general provisions on inspection 
requirements. Its key stipulation on inspections is enshrined in Article 34(1), which requires 
Member States to subject waste operators to Ôappropriate periodic inspections by the 
competent authoritiesÕ. In contrast, the most recent generation of EU environmental 
legislative instruments contain far more detailed inspection provisions, exemplified by the 
Industrial Emissions Directive,39 the Seveso III Directive40 and recent amendments 
introduced to the Waste Shipments Regulation.41 They flesh out and adapt the core 
stipulations of the RMCEI to the particular sectoral requirements at hand, and contain 
minimum standards with respect to inspection planning, inspection visits (routine and non-
routine), recording and reporting of inspections as well as inter-authority co-operation.42 
																																																																																																																																																																																													
36See Art.35 EAEC (Euratom Treaty) and Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for 
the nuclear safety of nuclear installations [2009] OJ L172/18 as amended by Directive 2014/87/Euratom [2014] 
OJ L219/42. 
37 Regulation 768/2005 establishing a Community Fisheries Control Agency and amending Regulation 2847/93 
[2005] OJ L347 in conjunction with Regulation 1224/2009 establishing a Community control system for 
ensuring compliance with the rules of the CFP [2009] OJ L343. 
38Directive 2008/98 on waste and repealing certain directives [2008] L312/3. The 2008 directive does little to 
add to provisions on inspections contained in earlier versions of the Waste Framework Directive.  
39 Directive 2010/75, n.30 above. 
40 Directive 2012/18, n.31 above. 
41 Regulation 1013/2006 on shipments of waste [2006] OJ L190/1 as amended by Reg.660/2014 [2014] OJ 
L189/135.	
42 For further discussion on the latest generation of inspection provisions, see Ch11 of Hedemann-Robinson 
(2015) n.1 above. 
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Table 1 below provides an overview of the variegation of spread of obligations on 
environmental inspection requirements contained current Union legislation. 
 
Table 1: EU environmental legislation on inspections by national authorities 
 
The pursuit of a Ôsectoral trackÕ approach to inspection regulation in the EU environmental 
policy sector has been justified principally on pragmatic grounds. Particular environmental 
sectors have been prioritised for EU legislative attention according to the perceived level of 
environmental risk of specific activities and in light of the overall record amongst Member 
States on implementation. This pragmatic and piecemeal approach to policy development has 
led to a great variation in terms of range, specificity and intensity of inspection obligations 
across sectors, sometimes difficult to justify. To take but one example, widely differing 
approaches exist amongst legislative instruments regarding updating inspection plans. The 
the EUÕs waste shipment rules require Member States, as from the beginning of 2017, to 
update inspection plans every three years.43 The  inspection plans of installations covered by 
industrial emissions and major accident hazard controls regulations are subject to the looser, 
vaguer requirement of having to be Ôregularly reviewedÕ.44 In other areas (waste management 
other than shipment, ozone depleting substances and animal experimentation) no specific 
inspection planning review requirements are stipulated. Whilst it might be argued that the 
sectoral approach has certain advantages (notably, by tailoring inspection standards according 
to particular identified needs of a regulated area), in practice this had led to a lack of 
coordination between sectors and to some inconsistency between the sectoral instruments. 
Notably, national (and sub-national) environmental inspectorate systems charged with 
overseeing the correct implementation of EU environmental law are confronted with complex 
technical and managerial challenges as they have to  take on board the multiplicity of 
legislative instrumentation and diversity of obligations at Union level on inspection 
standards. An additional problem is presented by the significant gaps regarding the current 
material scope of EU environmental inspection standards legislation. Notably, the nature 
protection, water and air quality sectors have not yet been made subject to any specific 
minimum standards provision. Moreover, there are no binding requirements on minimum 
																																																													
43 Art.50 (2a) Regulation 1013/2006 on shipments of waste as amended, n.41 above. 
44 See Art.23 (2) of Directive 2010/75, n.30 above, and Art.20(3) of Directive 2012/18, n.31 above. 
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levels of resourcing for inspectorates45 and only a very few instruments foresee a role for EU 
level inspections. All these gaps and inconsistencies underline the shortcomings of over-
reliance on a sectoral track approach and identify a need for the EU to ensure that it has 
effective systems in place to ensure appropriate ÔhorizontalÕ co-ordination of inspections 
management across environmental sectors.   As will be discussed in the next section, the 
Union has identified a need for improvement in this regard in its Seventh Environment 
Action Programme (2013-2020).  
   
Brief mention must also be made of the distinct systems of audit control established by 
particular Union legislative instruments concerning EU climate policy, specifically in relation 
to GHG emissions trading and carbon emissions from maritime transport.  In these areas the 
Union has developed control mechanisms that focus on actors other than national competent 
authorities that are directly engaged in inspection activity.    Under the auspices of the EUÕs 
legislation on the UnionÕs Emission Trading Scheme (ETS),46 implementation assurance of 
its Ôcap and tradeÕ scheme on greenhouse emissions of industrial installations rests principally 
upon two control ÔpillarsÕ, namely oversight of monitoring and reporting by operators of 
emissions47 as well as verification of GHG emission reports.48 The combined function of 
these control systems is to ensure that at the end of each year installations surrender a correct 
amount of emission allowances corresponding to their emission levels, so to ensure that the 
EU ETS system works effectively and is not subject to fraud or abuse.  Under the first control 
pillar, national competent authorities are charged with the responsibility to check that 
operators have in place appropriate emission monitoring plans for the purpose of compiling 
accurate data on their GHG emissions. Under the second control pillar, Member States are to 
ensure that nationally accredited auditors (or ÔverifiersÕ) check to see that each installationÕs 
monitoring plan has been implemented correctly by the operator, a process that involves 
																																																													
45 The Industrial Emissions Directive 2010/75, n.30 above, is one of the few pieces of sectoral legislation that 
broach the subject of resourcing of inspectorates, but does so in a weak fashion. Specifically, recital 26 of the 
preamble to the Industrial Emissions Directive 2010/75 exhorts Member States to Ôensure that sufficient staff are 
available with the skills and qualifications necessary to carry out [IED] inspections effectivelyÕ. The directive 
does not contain any specific binding requirements on the matter, though. 
46 The main framework instrument being Directive 2003/87 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the Community and amending Directive 96/61 [2003] OJ L275/32 as amended (most 
recently by Directive 2009/29 [ 2009] OJ L140/63) (Emissions Trading Directive or ÔETDÕ). 
47 See Regulation 601/2012 on the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 
2003/87 [2012] OJ L181/30 as amended (most recently by Reg.743/2014 [2014] OJ L201/1). 
48 See Regulation 600/2012 on the verification of greenhouse gas emission reports and tonne-kilometre reports 
and the accreditation of verifiers pursuant to Directive 2003/87 [2012] OJ L181/1.	
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sampling and site visit inspection.49 Verification is important for the operator, for without it 
the latter is barred from engaging in future emissions allowance trading and is also liable for 
payment of an excess emissions penalty if found to have failed to surrender a sufficient 
number of emission allowances.50 In practice, inspections are carried out by private 
undertakings acting as verifiers,51 authorised under the aegis of a national accreditation 
framework,52 whose verification reports are subject to a system of prior independent review.53 
National competent authority work focuses essentially on the upstream control work of 
scrutinising the propriety of operatorsÕ emission monitoring plans. Recently, the EU has also 
adopted legislation concerning auditing of GHG emissions from the maritime transport sector 
which is in broad alignment with the approach taken in respect of emissions trading. EU 
Regulation 2015/75754 requires operators of ships over 5,000 gross tonnage using EU ports to 
ensure that, with effect from January 2018,  their monitoring and reporting of CO" emissions 
is subject to independent auditing from accredited verifiers, who may undertake spot-checks 
to determine the reliability of operator reports.55  
 
2.3. Impact of the EUÕs Seventh Environment Action Programme (EAP7) 
With the adoption of its Seventh Environment Action Programme (EAP7) (2013-2020)56the 
EUÕs position on the issue of environmental inspections has evolved to become far more 
resolute and ambitious. Notably, an express commitment is enshrined within EAP7 on 
extending binding criteria on minimum inspection standards as well as the promotion of 
support capacity at EU level. This assurance followed an earlier 2012 Commission 
Communication57concerning ways and means of enhancing delivery of Union environmental 
measures, in which the Commission signalled its intention to push for Union legislative 
																																																													
49 See Arts.20-21 of Reg.600/2012, n.48 above. 
50 See Arts.15-16 of ETS Directive 2003/87, n.46 above. 
51 The EU legislation does not specifically rule out the possibility of officials of national competent authorities 
acting as verifiers where appropriately qualified, but it is unlikely that in practice authorities would have the 
requisite staff resources to do this. For comments on the use of private verifiers, see  M. Peeters, ÔThe 
Enforcement of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in Europe: Reliability Ensured?Õ in  L. Paddock et al (eds.) 
Compliance and Enforcement in Environmental Law: Toward More Effective Implementation (Edward Elgar, 
2011) at pp417-418. 
52 See Chs IV-V of Reg.600/2012 (supra n78). The system of accreditation is developed out of the one used for 
accreditation for marketing of products under Regulation 765/2008 (OJ 2008 L218/30). 
53 Art.25 of Reg.600/2012, n.48 above. 
54 Regulation 2015/757 on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime 
transport, and amending Directive 2009/16 [2015] OJ L123/55). 
55 See esp. Art.15 of Reg.2015/757, n.54 above. 
56 Decision 1386/2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 - Living well, within the 
limits of our planet, n.8 above.  
57 COM (2012)95 final, Commission Communication Improving the delivery of benefits from EU environmental 
measures: building confidence through better knowledge and responsiveness, 7.3.2012. 
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approval broadening and upgrading the existing EU framework on inspections and 
surveillance.58The EUÕs recent drive to expand its work in the area of environmental 
inspections is enshrined within one of nine priority objectives of EAP7, namely Priority 
Objective 459concerning implementation. Within Priority Objective 4 inspections and 
surveillance co-exist with three other implementation matters that the Union wishes to 
enhance.60The principal provision regarding the development of existing EU policy regarding 
inspections and surveillance is contained in paragraph 65(iii) of the Annex to the Decision 
adopting the EAP7, which stipulates that the UnionÕs environment policy programme 
requires: 
 
 Ôextending binding criteria for effective Member State inspections and surveillance to 
 the wider body of Union environmental law, and further developing inspection 
 support capacity at Union level, drawing on existing structures, backed up by 
 support for networks of professionals such as IMPEL, and by the reinforcement of
 peer reviews and best practice sharing, with a view to increasing the efficiency and 
 effectiveness of inspectionsÕ. 
 
This EAP7 provision accordingly committed to bolster the  EU engagement in the area of 
environmental inspections along two dimensions: by enhancing the inspection systems of 
national competent authorities and also through the complementary development of 
inspection capability at EU institutional level. Both dimensions will be considered briefly 
below. To date, the Commission has only begun to focus in earnest on the first of the two 
dimensions, namely at the level of national inspectorates. 
 
2.4. National environmental inspections and EAP7 
Until very recently, the European CommissionÕs services within its Environment Directorate-
General (DG ENV) were actively working on a proposal for a general horizontal EU directive 
on national environmental inspection standards. This work followed a 2011 impact 
																																																													
58 See pp 7-8 of COM (2012)95, n.57 above. 
59 Priority Objective 4 (To maximise the benefits of Union environmental legislation by improving 
implementation) of the Annex to Dec.1386/2013, n.8 above. 
60 The three other matters concern improvements to: information collection and dissemination on the state of 
implementation, national systems handling environmental complaints as well as access to environmental justice 
(in accordance with the rhus Convention and Union law). (See paras.58-65(a)-(e) of the Annex to 
Dec.1386/2013, n.8 above). 
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assessment study considering options for revision of the RMCEI61 as well as a stakeholder 
consultation which delivered strong support for strengthening the existing EU legal 
framework.62 The Commission held a number of stakeholder meetings, including expert 
workshops, which revealed some broad contours of the initial thinking of its internal services 
(i.e. within the DG ENV). These indicate that the Commission services within DG ENV are 
minded to recommend a prospective horizontal framework directive to promote coherence 
within existing EU legislation on environmental inspections.63 The initiative would be legally 
binding, in contrast to the RMCEI. It would cover the broad span of EU existing 
environmental legislation, some 40 measures concerning the water, industrial emissions, 
major accident hazards, air, waste, chemicals, nature and biodiversity sectors as well as 
certain cross-cutting aspects.64 The draft legislative initiative envisaged by DG ENV would 
be based on a compliance assurance approach, which entails Member States utilising risk 
assessment for the purposes of identifying strategically principal non-compliance problems, 
before applying various risk mitigation techniques (compliance promotion, monitoring and 
enforcement) in order to enhance levels of adherence to EU environmental legislation. 
Specifically, it would oblige Member States to fulfil a range of duties beyond those in the 
RMCEI including undertaking the following steps in a compliance assurance chain: 
¥ Risk assessment (Stage 1): Each Member State to undertake a strategic risk 
assessment of non-compliance within their respective territories, reviewable every 4 
years. The strategic assessment would serve inter alia to identify sectors with notable 
compliance issues and accordingly warrant greater inspection prioritisation. This 
would be accompanied operationally by national surveillance and inspection plans 
along the lines of the RMCEI model as developed by the IED and Seveso III 
																																																													
61COWI/ECORYS/CE Impact assessment study into possible options for revising Recommendation 2001/331 
providing for minimum criteria for environmental inspections - Final Report for the European Commission 
(2011) (ENV.G.1/FRA/2006/0073). Available for inspection on the CommissionÕs DG ENV website at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/inspections.htm	
62 The details of the stakeholder consultation process and findings are available for inspection on the 
CommissionÕs DG ENV website at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/inspections.htm	
63 These observations are based upon an Outline Paper and Explanatory Paper presented by the European 
CommissionÕs DG ENV at a joint workshop between the Commission and IMPEL in Rome in December 2014. 
The papers presented to the workshop area available for inspection at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/inspections.htm. 
64 Specifically, matters covered by Directive 2004/35 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention 
and remedying of environmental damage [2004] OJ L143/56 (Environmental Liability Directive), Directive 
2007/2 establishing an Infrastructure for Spatial Information in the EC [2007] OJ L108/1 (INSPIRE Directive) 
and Directive 2011/92 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment 
[2012] OJ  L26/1 (Environmental Impact Assessment or EIA Directive) as amended. The DG ENV Outline 
Paper contains an Annex listing the EU environmental legislation to be covered by the prospective EU 
framework inspections instrument. 
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Directive, reviewable every two years. Such plans would incorporate a risk 
assessment approach, include appropriate levels of routine and non-routine 
inspections as well as develop effective inter-agency coordination. In particular, 
national plans would be crafted in light of the results of the overall strategic 
assessment, which would appraise the relative state of non-compliance concerning EU 
environmental protection rules. 
 
¥ Risk mitigation (Stage 2): EU Member States would take steps to mitigate against the 
non-compliance risks identified at the initial risk assessment stage by deploying three 
core tools or techniques, namely: compliance promotion, compliance monitoring (via 
surveillance, inspections and investigations) as well as enforcement.65 The overall 
approach to risk mitigation would be to encourage Member States to consider 
deployment of the most effective risk mitigation technique suitable to the particular 
non-compliance scenario, bearing in mind that recourse to softer compliance 
promotion initiatives (such as the provision of advice and assistance or securing 
undertakings from operators)  may well be more effective in practice in the long term 
to attaining better levels of implementation amongst operators other than persistent or 
intentional serious offenders. In terms of recourse to enforcement, national authorities 
would be encouraged to consider using one or more sanctions (informal or formal, 
light or heavy) in proportion to the incident of detected non-compliance with EU 
environmental rules. The CommissionÕs thinking here resonates strongly with the 
United Kingdom (UK) approach with respect to supervisory operations of regulatory 
authorities. Other key aspects of risk mitigation signalled in the CommissionÕs outline 
documentation include requiring Member States to ensure that follow-up strategies 
are consistently drawn up for cases of detected non-compliance as well as that 
reporting and transparency underpins inspection and surveillance activities of national 
authorities. 
The Commission has made considerable headway with the proposal, yet it may still be some 
way off from being ready to recommend the launch of a formal draft initiative. There may 
well be further need for informal discussion with stakeholders. Moreover, the DG ENV draft 
does not (yet) contain provisions to ensure that Member State implementation of the 
																																																													
65 The DG ENV Explanatory Paper refers to these tools/techniques as being the Ôthree pillarsÕ of risk mitigation.  
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instrument is subject to sufficiently rigorous review and that the issue of adequate Member 
State resourcing of inspection systems is appropriately addressed. 
As far as review is concerned, a number of requirements could be integrated within the draft 
legislative text which would serve as useful checks to monitor Member State compliance 
with the prospective EU environmental inspection instrument. As a minimum the draft 
instrument should incorporate the existing review provisions contained in the RMCEI, 
namely Member State duties to report on implementation experience to the European 
Commission in conjunction with provision for a periodic Commission review as to whether 
legislative amendments or additions need to be made to the EU measure. The inclusion of 
Member State reporting obligations to the Commission on the state of and experience gleaned 
from implementing the EU instrumentÕs requirements are particularly important, given the 
current paucity of reliable data and information on national inspection systems provided to 
date under the aegis of the RMCEI and relevant sectoral EU environmental legislation. The 
non-binding status of the RMCEI no doubt contributed to the poor quality of implementation 
feedback provided by Member States, whilst the various provisions on inspection 
requirements contained within EU environmental legislation have not typically been made 
the subject of a robust implementation review process. Review procedures in a successor 
instrument to the RMCEI could be usefully supplemented with the inclusion of a Member 
State duty to undergo periodic independent auditing of their inspection regimes to appraise 
effectiveness of delivery of EU requirements. Independent auditing could be conducted by a 
range of actors, such as a private environmental consultancy, national audit authority, IMPEL 
or the European Commission. Arguably, IMPEL would be a strong candidate to assume such 
a role, given its technical expertise (its membership drawn from national environmental 
authorities), wealth of accumulated information on Member State inspectorate structures as 
well as long-standing experience in voluntary auditing of Member State environmental 
authorities. Other flanking review mechanisms could conceivably be used, such as conferral 
of implementing powers to the Commission under the aegis of the ÔcomitologyÕ process66  
although this might well be resisted by Member States as an overly centralising move. 
The issue of adequate resourcing of national inspectorates is an important one which lies at 
the heart of achieving an effective environmental monitoring system. At first glance, it might 
																																																													
66 See Art.291 (2)-(4) TFEU and Regulation 182/2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning 
mechanisms for control by Member States of the CommissionÕs exercise of implementing powers [2011] OJ 
L155/13.  Post-Lisbon, ÔcomitologyÕ envisages the conferral of powers of implementation on the Commission in 
legally binding Union acts, where uniform conditions for the lattersÕ implementation are needed.  
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seem logical to expect that a general EU instrument on inspections should incorporate 
minimum standards on resourcing aspects (including notably quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of personnel, training and equipment). However, for political, administrative-
technical and legal reasons the European Commission has little room for manoeuvre. From a 
political perspective, the issue of administrative resourcing is highly sensitive, not least since 
it directly impinges upon national budgetary decisions concerning financing of public 
services. The Council of the EU too is likely to have significant concerns about loss of 
national administrative autonomy if any Commission proposal seeks to introduce clauses on 
common minimum resourcing requirements. Secondly, it has proven problematic technically 
to establish agreement between environmental authorities within IMPEL over the use of 
resourcing benchmarks (notably regarding personnel numbers) as a common performance 
indicator criteria.67 Thirdly, from a legal perspective, in the wake of amendments introduced 
by the Lisbon Treaty the EU treaty framework excludes generally the possibility of the Union 
adopting harmonising measures concerning improvements to national administrative 
ÔcapacityÕ.68The latter aspect is considered in more detail in Section 3 below. 
Accordingly, it is not that surprising to find that most existing EU environmental inspection 
rules essentially side-step the subject of resourcing levels of inspectorates. On the very few 
occasions that the issue of administrative resourcing has been incorporated within EU 
environmental legislative instrumentation, it has only been done in very general69 or 
exhortatory70 terms, thereby essentially deferring key decisions to Member States.  However, 
this does not mean that the Commission should have to drop the issue of resourcing entirely 
from a draft general EU environmental inspections instrument, far from it.  It does not need to 
remain the elephant in the room. Notably, it would be most useful if the draft legislative 
instrument were to include provision requiring Member States to be transparent about the 
																																																													
67 See e.g. IMPEL Project Report 2009/03 Developing performance indicators for environmental inspection 
systems (April 2010), esp. discussion on inspector numbers at pp8-9. 
68 See Art.197 (2) TFEU. 
69 See Art.50(2a)(f) and (g) of Reg.1013/2006 on waste shipments as amended by Reg.660/2014, n.41 above, 
which requires Member States by 1.1.2017 to ensure that their waste shipment inspection plans include 
information on Ôthe training of inspectors on matters relating to inspectionsÕ and Ôthe human, financial and other 
resources for that planÕ.  See also Art.5(2)(c) of Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community 
framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations as amended, 36 above, which requires that the 
competent national regulatory authority Ôis given dedicated and appropriate budget allocations to allow for the 
delivery of its regulatory tasks as defined in the national frameworkÕ.  
70 See recital 26 of the preamble to the Industrial Emissions Directive 2010/75, n.30 above, which states that 
ÔMember States should ensure that sufficient staff are available with the skills and qualifications needed to carry 
out those inspections effectivelyÕ. See also recital 26 to the Seveso III Directive 2012/18, n.31 above, which 
additionally states that Õcompetent authorities should provide appropriate support  using tools and mechanisms 
for exchanging experience and consolidating knowledge including at Union level.Õ 
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level of resources they invest in their inspectorate systems, with an obligation to report 
resource data regularly to the Commission. Such an obligation would enable the Commission 
to make publicly available a comparative report on Member State resourcing of their 
inspectorates. Such transparency would assist in shining a light on weak spots in national 
inspection systems as well as placing soft, indirect pressure on Member States to take 
remedial action, as appropriate. Moreover, a general provision requiring Member States to 
ensure that their inspection systems are effective in assisting Member States in the fulfilment 
of their implementation responsibilities could serve as a useful, albeit indirect, legal 
guarantee against manifestly deficient inspection systems. Specifically, where the level of 
investment by a Member State in its inspection system is clearly incapable of delivering 
effective compliance monitoring of EU environmental legislative requirements, the 
Commission could use this evidence in support of an infringement case under Articles 
258/260 TFEU on the basis of non-compliance with the effectiveness requirement.  Arguably, 
such a clause might receive sufficient support from all sides. From the perspective of most 
Member States, it would be likely to assuage concerns about undue supranational intrusion 
into the sphere of national administrative autonomy. At the same time, such a clause would 
have some teeth in upholding the collective Union interest in ensuring effective application of 
EU law, which is attractive from the CommissionÕs perspective.  
Notwithstanding DG ENVÕs substantial interest and engagement invested in a successor 
initiative to the RMCEI, it is not clear when (or indeed if) the current college of 
Commissioners will be receptive to the adoption of a formal legislative proposal for a 
directive to replace the 2001 recommendation.  Enhancing the implementation of EU 
environmental law, including the issues of environmental inspections and access to 
environmental justice identified in EAP7, does not feature among the list of priorities 
identified in the Commission PresidentÕs published mission letter71 of November 2014 to 
Karmenu Vella, Commissioner for Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, for his five 
year tenure. The new administrative structure within the Commission organised by the 
President also makes it difficult for a fresh legislative initiative to emerge. Notably, for any 
new legislative proposal to be included within the CommissionÕs annual work programme,72 
one of the Commission Vice-Presidents must first recommend it on the basis that it seemingly 
																																																													
71 Available for inspection at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vella_en. 
72 The CommissionÕs Work Programme for 2015 is set out in COM (2014)910 Commission Communication 




fits within the 2014 Political Guidelines presented by the Commission President to the 
European Parliament.73 Given that environmental policy, other than in respect to climate 
change, barely features amongst the ten priorities of the PresidentÕs Political Guidelines,74 it 
may well prove a tough task for DG ENV to persuade the Commission hierarchy to adopt a 
legislative proposal on environmental inspections. The strongest argument in favour of a new 
initiative to replace the RMCEI is the fact that the EU has specifically endorsed such a move 
under the auspices of EAP7, which is underpinned by a legally binding Union decision. Time 
will tell how these factors will play out politically. However, informal feedback from within 
the CommissionÕs services suggests that a formal endorsement of any initiative is unlikely to 
be forthcoming soon. The CommissionÕs Work Programme for 2015 did not include amongst 
its list of Commission initiatives for the initial calendar year of the new Commission college 
a proposal on environmental inspections. This suggests, perhaps rather ominously, that the 
Commission Ôwill not present proposals that do not contribute to [the] prioritiesÕ of the 
Political GuidelinesÕ, Ôwill apply [the practice of] political discontinuityÕ75 and Ôwill take off 
the table pending proposals that do not match our objectives or which are going nowhereÕ.76  
 
2.5. Environmental inspections at EU institutional level and EAP7 
For several years a debate has rumbled on over whether environmental inspection capacity at 
EU institutional level should be developed. On the one hand, the European Parliament has 
registered its approval of the establishment of an EU-level inspectorate capability on a 
number of occasions.77On the other hand, EU Member States have traditionally been 
																																																													
73 Junker J-C, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change: 
Political Guidelines for the next European Commission (July 2014). Available for inspection at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf 
74 The Political Guidelines identify 10 priority policy areas for the Commission college appointed for the period 
2015-2020, which in broad terms may be highlighted as: jobs, growth and investment; digitalisation of the 
single market; energy union in conjunction with climate change policy; strengthening of internal market; 
deepening of economic  and monetary union; attainment of a free trade agreement with the US; deepening the 
area of justice in conjunction with fundamental rights; development of a new migration policy; strengthening of 
Union external relations and strengthening of democratic structures of EU decision-making. 
75  In accordance with point 39 subpara.2 of the Framework Inter-institutional Agreement on Relations between 
the European Parliament and Commission [2010] OJ L304/47 which stipulates that: 
 ÒThe Commission shall proceed with a review of all pending proposals at the beginning of the 
 CommissionÕs term of office, in order to politically confirm or withdraw them, taking due account of 
 the view expressed by Parliament.Ó 
76 COM (2014)910final, Commission Work Programme 2015: A New Start, 16.12.2004. 
77 See notably the 2008 EP Resolution on the review of Recommendation 2001/331(P6_TA(2008)0568) of 
10.10.2008 (at para. 5) and 1999 EP Resolution on the proposal for a Council Recommendation providing for 
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generally sceptical or resistant to the idea of endowing EU institutions with inspection 
powers in the environmental sector. Suggestions in the early 1990s to invest the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) with inspection powers were shot down by Member States.78 
Whilst the EU legislation setting up the EEA specifically refers to the possible development 
of supervisory functions being assigned to the Agency at a later date,79 the Commission did 
not take up this issue in subsequent years when submitting amendments to the EEAÕs 
statutes.80 In 1997, the Council reaffirmed its clear disapproval of the establishment of a 
system of centrally and supranationally organised system of European environmental 
inspectors.81 The resistance to development of a supranational dimension to environmental 
inspections was also reiterated within the preamble of the RMCEI.82 Historically, Member 
States have resisted moves to establish a strong centralized inspection regime at Union level 
akin to that set up in other federal systems, such as the US.83 
 
More recently however, the EAP7 has revived political interest in this area, signalling 
potentially a more open-minded approach to the idea of EU institutional involvement in 
inspections.  Paragraph 65(iii) of the Annex to the EAP7 Decision84stipulates that the UnionÕs 
environment policy programme requires Ôfurther developing inspection support capacity at 
Union level, drawing on existing structuresÕ. DG ENV has indicated its interest in this area, 
having commissioned a study, which was published in 2013, on examining options for 
strengthening the EU level role in environmental inspections and strengthening the 
CommissionÕs capacity to undertake effective investigations into alleged breaches in EU 
environmental law. 85 The study identified three options potentially available to develop the 
CommissionÕs role in inspections, namely: (1) conferral of audit powers to the Commission 
																																																																																																																																																																																													
minimum criteria for environmental inspections in the Member States of 26.4.1999 (PE.229.97/fin A4-0251/99) 
especially point B.2 of Explanatory Statement. 
78 Macrory has pointed out, though, that the UK government at the time appeared initially open to consider an 
auditing role for the Agency. See R. Macrory R, ÔThe Enforcement of Community environmental law: some 
critical issuesÕ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 347. 
79See Art.20 of Regulation 1210/90 on the establishment of the European Environment Agency and the 
European environment information and observation network [1990 OJ L120/1, as amended by Regulation 
93/1999 [1999] OJ L117/1. 
80As published in the Official Journal of the EU [1997] OJ C255/9 and [1998] OJ C123/6. 
81[1997] OJ C321/1. 
82 See recital 5 to the preamble of the 2001 RMCEI, n.16 above. 
83 See e.g.  E. Hall, ÔEnvironmental Law in the EU: New Approach for EnforcementÕ (2007) Tulane 
Environmental Law Journal pp 277-303 at 294-5. See also n.114 below. 
84 Decision 1386/2013, n.8 above. 
85 BIO Intelligence Service/EcoLogic/IEEP, Study on possible options for strengthening the EU level role in 
environmental inspections and strengthening the CommissionÕs capacity to undertake effective investigations of 




to oversee national inspectorate systems; (2) conferral of inspection powers to the 
Commission and (3) an enhanced peer review approach to inspections based on IMPELÕs 
approach with potentially enhanced Commission oversight.  
 
A particularly interesting feature of the study was that it underlined that the European 
Commission already has acquired a range of audit and inspection powers in some 
environmental policy areas. Specifically, such powers are conferred by EU legislation in the 
following environmental sectors: ozone depleting substances,86the common fisheries policy 
(CFP), 87civil nuclear energy88and scientific experimentation on animals.89Under the Ozone 
Depleting Substances Regulation (ODSR),90 the Commission may request national authorities 
to carry out investigations which may conceivably involve Commission participation. Yet 
direct involvement of Commission officials in ODS inspections is essentially theoretical and 
very rarely undertaken, not least given the limited number of staff available within DG ENV 
and the latterÕs recognition of superior knowledge of ODS sites held by national authorities.91 
The Commission also has the right to obtain all necessary information from Member States, 
competent authorities and undertakings.92  The CFP regime endows the Commission with a 
stronger and more established inspection role. The EU Fisheries Control Agency is entrusted 
with responsibility to coordinate fisheries control and inspections by national authorities for 
the purposes of supervising implementation of CFP rules.93 In addition, EU level inspectors 
(Commission officials) have powers to undertake verification and inspections of fishing 
vessels and premises of entities engaged in CFP activities.94 Under the aegis of the EUÕs 
Animal Experimentation Directive,95 the Commission is vested with an auditing (as opposed 
to an inspection) role. It has power to conduct audits of national control systems in relation to 
animal experimentation where there is due reason for concern that those systems are not 
functioning sufficiently effectively. In the civil nuclear energy sector, EU law invests 
Commission with auditing and inspection tasks in relation to civil nuclear installations for the 
																																																													
86 Regulation 1005/2009 on substances that deplete the ozone layer (recast), n.33 above. 
87 See Regulation 768/2005 establishing a Community Fisheries Agency and Regulation 1224/09 establishing a 
Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy, n.37 above. 
88 Art.35 European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) Treaty. 
89 Directive 2010/63 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes [2010] OJ L276/33. 
90 Regulation 1005/2009, n.33 above. 
91As indicated in the Study by BIO Intelligence Service/EcoLogic/IEEP (op cit.n94). 
92 See Art.28 of Reg.1005/2009, n.33 above. 
93 See Reg.768/2005 n.37 above. 
94 See Art.97 of Reg.1224/2009, n.37 above. 
95 Directive 2010/63, n.89 above. 
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purpose of radioactivity monitoring.96 For several years, the Commission has organised 
periodic site inspections in order to verify compliance with EU safety requirements in this 
sector.97 
 
It is also evident that the Commission is vested with a number of well-established inspection 
powers in non-environmental sectors. Notable examples include Commission controls in the 
EU policy domains relating to food and veterinary safety98as well as competition.99 The 
UnionÕs Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) based within the CommissionÕs Health and Food 
Safety Directorate General (DG SANTE)100 has a range of supervisory controls to oversee 
appropriate implementation and enforcement of EU rules on food safety, animal health, 
animal welfare, plant health and medical devices. Established in the wake of the BSE crisis in 
the late 1990s, its principal role is to carry out audit checks on behalf of the Commission to 
appraise the effectiveness of Member State authority control and compliance systems. 
Auditing intensity is calibrated upon a risk assessment analysis of national control systems. In 
addition, the FVO may carry out inspections of national authorities where specific problems 
have been identified or where otherwise specifically required.  The FVO carries out some 150 
audits annually, with some 170 staff. The FVO audit-inspection model was considered as a 
potential model in the 2013 study commissioned by DG ENV to assess options for 
strengthening the EU level role in environmental inspections.101 The Commission had a 
strong inspection and sanctioning role in relation to the policing of EU competition policy for 
several years dating back to the early 1960s.102 Since 2003, EU legislation103 has vested the 
Commission as well as national competition authorities with joint powers for the purposes of 
supervising the application of EU competition rules to combat anti-competitive agreements 
																																																													
96  See Art.35 EAEC. 
97 See European Commission report covering the period 2008-2012: SWD (2013)226 Commission Staff 
Working Document On the application of Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty: Verification of the operation and 
efficiency of facilities for continuous monitoring of the levels of radioactivity in the air, water and soil, 
18.6.2013. 
98Regulation 882/2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and 
food law, animal health and animal welfare rules [2004] OJ L165/1, as amended. 
99 Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1 as amended and Regulation 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ L24/1. 
100 For information on the FVO see: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food_veterinary_office/index_en.htm 
101Study by BIO Intelligence Service/EcoLogic/IEEP, op cit.n94. 
102 See former Regulation 17/62 First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the [former EEC] Treaty 
[1962] OJ L13/204. For information on the CommissionÕs investigatory role in EU competition policy see the 
CommissionÕs Competition Directorate-GeneralÕs website (DG COMP) at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures_101_en.html	
103 See Regulation 1/2003, n.99 above. 
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and abuse of dominance.104 The Commission has a range of significant powers in this field, 
including the power to request information, arrange unannounced investigations of business 
premises, seize equipment and records, and take witness statements.105 Failures by 
corporations to comply with an investigation may attract significant financial penalties 
imposed by the Commission.106 
 
To date, the European Commission has not signalled that it is likely to come forward with 
any new general initiative concerning inspections powers to be held at EU institutional level. 
Its relatively recent interest in exploring this area further, as reflected in the 2013 study 
commissioned by DG ENV as well as the reference to development of inspection support 
capacity at EU level in EAP7,107 appears to have cooled within the context of the tenure of 
the current Commission College (2014-2019).   This is regrettable, given that an initiative to 
vest powers of investigation and auditing at supranational level in order to enhance the level 
of implementation of Union law would be beneficial. It would serve to strengthen the 
operation of the infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU in relation to the appraisal 
of bad application cases and provide a framework for conducting more effective monitoring 
of the effectiveness of national authority environmental inspection systems. 
 
 
3. ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTION REGULATION AND 
     THE EU ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL CONTEXT 
 
In addition to the initial cool reaction of the current Commission college towards EU- level 
action on inspections, it appears that other challenges lie in the way of Union policy 
development.  Certain political and legal hurdles need yet to be overcome in order for the EU 
to be able to identify with adequate precision how a supranational inspection framework 
could be appropriately accommodated within the administrative architecture that services EU 
environmental policy.  Notably, the EU legislature would have to ensure that it does not 
overstep the boundaries of policy competence set for the Union and thereby encroach 
unlawfully on matters reserved for Member State action. This is not as easy as one might 
																																																													
104 For a general overview of the operation of the joint supervisory arrangements (collectively the EU 
Competition Network) see COM(2014) 453, Commission Communication Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement 
under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives, 9.7.2014. 
105 See Arts.18-21 of Reg.1/2003, n.99 above.	
106 See Arts.23-24, ibid. 
107 Para. 65(iii) of the Annex to Dec.1386/2013, n.8 above. 
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think, notwithstanding the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, which had as a principal objective to 
introduce amendments to the UnionÕs foundational treaty framework so as to provide clarity 
on the extent of EU competence.  
 
Before considering specifically the issue of legal competence, it is worth considering in more 
general terms the broader context of the division of roles between Union institutions and 
Member State authorities regarding the delivery of EU policy decisions within what has been 
termed as an emerging European ÔcompositeÕ or ÔintegratedÕ administrative space.108As is 
commonly recognised, the division of labour between Union institutions and national 
authorities concerning implementation of EU policy varies greatly across sectors. In areas 
such as competition policy, the Commission has historically (if no longer necessarily 
effectively) a leading role in administering EU law (so-called ÔcentralisedÕ or Ôdirect 
administrationÕ). In other common policy areas such as in the Common Agricultural Policy or 
EU Structural Funds, the Commission has administered Union policy jointly with national 
authorities (Ôshared administrationÕ).  Alternatively, as in the case of Union environmental 
policy and most EU common policy matters, the task of implementation has largely been 
shouldered by Member States, with  a largely indirect role for the Commission in overseeing 
due implementation of EU legal requirements via mechanisms such as the infringement 
procedure (Ôindirect administrationÕ or Ôexecutive federalismÕ109). This traditional triadic 
description of the balance of implementation responsibilities may now be criticised for being 
overstated,110 in the sense that the balance of responsibilities between Union and Member 
States over implementation is now mostly shared111 but with varying degrees of intensity of 
supranational and national authority involvement based on hierarchical as well as 
heterarchical relationships.112 The characteristic sharing of administrative responsibilities 
between Union and Member State institutional levels with respect to the delivery of EU 
policy is also reflected more generally in the multi-level constitutional system of governance 
																																																													
108 See e.g. J. Reichel, ÔCommunicating with the European Composite AdministrationÕ (2014) 15 German Law 
Journal pp883-906 at 886 and H. Hofmann & A.Trk, ÔThe Development of Integrated Administration in the 
EU and its ConsequencesÕ (2007) 13(2) European Law Journal pp253-271 at 253-255. 
109 See e.g. R. Schtze, European Union Law (Cambridge, 2015) at p334. 
110 See C. Harlow, ÔThree Phases in the Evolution of EU Administrative LawÕ, in P. Craig & G. De Burca (eds.) 
The Evolution of EU Law 2nd Ed. (OUP, 2011) at p443. 
111 See e.g. P. Craig, EU Administrative Law 2nd ed (OUP, 2012) at p27 et seq. 
112 See e.g. E. Heidbreder, ÔStructuring the European administrative space: policy instruments of multi-level 
administrationÕ (2011) 18(5) Journal of European Public Policy pp709-727 at 709-710 and H. Hofmann & 
A.Trk A, n.108 above at p263. 
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within the EU legal order.113 Nevertheless, the triadic model remains a useful starting point to 
appraise the state of administrative responsibilities in relation to EU environmental policy.  
 
Notwithstanding some changes over time, it is fair to depict EU environmental policy as 
heavily reliant upon Member States for implementation at national level.114 Admittedly, since 
the EUÕs formal establishment of a common environmental policy in the mid-1980s under the 
aegis of the Single European Act (SEA) 1986 there has been an increased degree of 
organisational involvement at the European level in  matters closely or directly relating to 
implementation, such as through the European Environment Agency (EEA) in environmental 
data-gathering, through IMPEL's  facilitation of better implementation practice as well as 
inspections by the European Commission services in a limited number of environmental 
policy matters. However, in substance these developments have not served to change the 
predominant involvement of Member State authorities in ensuring delivery of EU 
environmental policy on the ground. The administrative architecture underpinning the 
delivery of EU environmental policy remains an example of Ôindirect administrationÕ. This is 
not that surprising for both political as well as pragmatic reasons. From a political 
perspective, it has been evident that a majority of EU Member States have remained sceptical 
regarding the idea of direct supranational institutional supervision in the delivery of Union 
policy at local level outside areas perceived to be most directly connected with transnational 
commercial aspects of the internal market (e.g. competition, banking) or disbursement of EU 
funds.115 From a pragmatic perspective, it has always been apparent that any direct 
involvement of the Commission (or other EU agency) in implementation supervision would 
be necessarily relatively limited owing to resource constraints.116 
 
																																																													
113 See I. Pernice ÔThe Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in ActionÕ (2008-9) 15 Columbia Journal 
of European Law pp349-407 esp at 373 et seq. 
114 This decentralised state of affairs may be contrasted with the far more centralised administration of 
environmental protection policy in certain federal systems such as the United States, in which the 
Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Justice have far-reaching powers to intervene in the states 
for the purpose of safeguarding compliance with federal environmental laws. See e.g. C. Cruden & B. Gelber, 
ÔFederal Civil Environmental Enforcement in the United States: Process, Players and PrioritiesÕ, in L. Paddock 
et al (eds.) Compliance and Enforcement in Environmental Law: Toward More Effective Implementation 
(Edward Elgar, 2011). Other federal systems of governance may, of course, adopt a more decentralised 
approach to the regulation of environmental protection like the EU, such as the UK, Germany, Belgium and 
Australia. 
115 For an overview of EU law in these centralized areas see e.g. Ch3 of P. Craig (2012), n.111 above. 
116 See e.g. J. Pollak & S. Puntscher Riekmann, ÔEuropean Administration: Centralisation and Fragmentation as 
means of Polity-Building?Õ (2008) 31(4) West European Politics pp771-788 at771. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that implementation of EU environmental law has remained heavily 
decentralised, it is also clear that the Union has always maintained an interest in overseeing 
the proper application of EU environmental obligations across Member States. 
Administrative autonomy at national level has never been absolute. The UnionÕs 
constitutional framework has acknowledged this from the outset in various foundational 
treaty obligations. This is underscored in particular by the so-called Ôgood faithÕ clause 
enshrined within the EU treaty framework contained in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), which places a general legal duty on Member States to take active 
steps to ensure adherence to EU obligations as well as engage in sincere cooperation with the 
Union for this purpose.117 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held that a 
number of implicit obligations incumbent on Member States (including their competent 
authorities) relevant to law enforcement flow from Article 4(3) TEU, including: the duty to 
proceed with same degree of vigilance in detecting breaches of EU law as for national law118; 
the duty to ensure that EU infringements are penalised with effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive sanctions119; and the duty of due diligence to review decision making so as to 
ensure conformity with EU law.120  Union interest in implementation matters is also attested 
by the EU foundational treaty provisions confirming the supervisory roles vested in the 
CJEU121 and European Commission122 to assist in ensuring the correct application of Union 
law in the Member States.   
 
The Union has in recent years stepped up the level of its engagement with implementation 
supervision in the environmental sector, exemplified by a range of initiatives relating to 
environmental inspections. It has also passed measures stipulating a range of sanctions to be 
applied for non-compliance with EU environmental law.123 These developments represent a 
																																																													
117 Art.4(3) TEU states:  
 ÒPursuant to the principle of sincere co-operation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full 
 mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. 
 The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of 
 the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of institutions of the Union. 
 The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the UnionÕs tasks and refrain from any measure 
 which could jeopardise the attainment of the UnionÕs objectives.Ó 
118See e.g. Case C-68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965 (esp. paras.23-24 of judgment). 
119 See e.g. Case C-354/99 Commission v Ireland [2001] ECR I-7657 (at para. of 46 of judgment).  
120 Case C-72/95 Aannemersbedriff P K Kraaijeveld BV [1996] ECR I-5403. 
121 Notably Art.19 (1) TEU and Art.267 TFEU. 
122 Notably, Art.17 TEU and Art.258/260 TFEU. 
123 Notably, by virtue of Directive 2004/35 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and 
remedying of environmental damage, n.64 above (criminal sanctions), Directive 2008/99on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law [2008] OJ L328/28 (administrative sanctions concerning environmental 
remediation), ETS Directive 2003/87 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
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response on the part of the Union to the challenge of upholding the effectiveness as well as 
legitimacy of federally agreed environmental protection standards in the face of long-
standing Member State failures Member State to secure binding EU legislative outcomes. 
Post-Lisbon, the UnionÕs general constitutional mandate in relation to implementation has 
been consolidated through the introduction of Article 197(1) TFEU which confirms that 
Ôeffective implementation of Union law by the Member States, which is essential for the 
proper functioning of the Union, shall be regarded as a matter of common interest' (emphasis 
added). 
 
However, countervailing forces exist in relation to these dynamics. Stubborn resistance 
expressed by several Member States towards greater levels of federal (EU) involvement in 
matters of implementation concerning EU environmental policy delivery, has if anything 
intensified.  Paradoxically, as the number of EU environmental measures on implementation 
(including inspection standards) has increased, Member States have placed greater 
constitutional checks and obstacles in the way of such developments. In particular, the 2007 
Lisbon Treaty has introduced two constitutional mechanisms liable to place potentially 
significant restraints on moves to increase federal (i.e. Union) involvement in the area of 
environmental inspections; specifically, the treaty provisions concerning subsidiarity and the 
limits to administrative cooperation enshrined within the new Title XXIV of Part III of the 
TFEU.  
 
Subsidiarity124 was first introduced as a generally applicable constitutional principle in EU 
law by virtue of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), after having been 
first applied solely to the area of EU environmental policy under the SEA. The definition of 
subsidiarity is set out in Article 5(3) TEU, which builds in a rebuttable presumption that 
Member State action is to be preferred over Union intervention in policy fields in respect of 
which the Union and Member States share competence (such as environment policy). 
  
																																																																																																																																																																																													
within the Community as amended, n.46 above (excess emissions financial penalty), Regulation 443/09 setting 
emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the CommunityÕs integrated approach to 
reduce CO" emissions from light-duty vehicles [2009] OJ L140/1 (as most recently amended by Regulation 
2015/6 [ 2015] OJ L3/1) and Regulation 510/2011 setting emission performance standards for new light 
commercial vehicles as part of the CommunityÕs integrated approach to reduce CO" emissions from light-duty 
vehicles [2011 OJ L145/1 (as most recently amended by Regulation 404/2014 [2014] OJ L121/1) (excess 
emissions premium to be paid in the event of exceedance of CO" emissions target).	
124 For overviews on the evolution and impact of the subsidiarity principle in EU administrative law see e.g. 
Ch14 of P. Craig (2012) n.111 above and Ch9 of R. Schtze (2015) n.109 above. 
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By virtue of Lisbon, the principle of subsidiarity has been significantly strengthened with the 
establishment of particular powers vested in national parliaments to request or force a review 
of EU legislative proposals deemed by a minimum proportion of Member State parliamentary 
assemblies to breach the requirements of subsidiarity set out in Article 5(3) TEU (the so-
called Ôyellow cardÕ and Ôorange cardÕ procedures).125Prior to Lisbon, the subsidiarity 
principle could only be enforced under the EU treaty framework by way of judicial review 
before the CJEU, whose case law has confirmed that the principle affords a wide margin of 
appreciation to the EU legislature in determining whether the Union should be deemed 
competent to act.126 Whilst the conditions attached to the national parliamentary review 
procedures are challenging127they are by no means impossible to fulfil. Since LisbonÕs entry 
into force in December 2009, the yellow card procedure has been invoked twice, once 
successfully leading the Commission to withdraw its proposal for a regulation concerning the 
exercise of the right of collective action within the context of the freedoms of establishment 
and service provision in September 2012.128 
 
In addition to strengthening subsidiarity, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a novel treaty clause 
expressly limiting the UnionÕs competence to take measures to shore up Member State 
administrative structures that deal with implementation matters. This limitation has been 
crystallized in Article 197(2) TFEU under Title XXIV on Administrative Cooperation of Part 
III of the TFEU which rules out the possibility of the Union adopting harmonising measures 
																																																													
125 Protocol (No2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality [2012] OJ C326. 
126 See e.g. paragraph 29 of CJEUÕs judgment in Case C-508/13 Estonia v EP and Commission (judgment of 
18.6.2015) in which the CJEU held that with regard to the judicial review of the application of Art.5(3) TEU 
Ôthe EU legislature must be allowed broad discretionÕ in areas which entail Ôpolitical, economic and social 
choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Consequently, the legality 
of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having 
regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue.Õ See also Case C-491/01 BAT 
(Investments) and American Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453 at paragraph 123 of judgment and Case C-58/08 
Vodafone et al [2010] ECR I-4999 at paragraph 52 of judgment.  
127 For the yellow card procedure to be triggered at least a third of the votes allocated to national parliaments 
must register a  negative reasoned opinion within 8 weeks of the national assemblies being notified of the 
legislative proposal (in accordance with Articles 6 and 7(2) of Protocol (No 2) n.125 above.  For the orange card 
procedure to operate, at a least a simple majority of votes allocated to national parliaments must register a 
negative reasoned opinion within the same time period (in accordance with Articles 6 and 7(3) of Protocol (No 
2)). 
128 The so-called ÔMonti IIÕ initiative: COM (2012)130 Commission proposal for a regulation on the exercise of 
the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services, 21.3.2012.  On the other occasion in which the yellow card procedure has been invoked by national 
parliaments to date the Commission decided not to withdraw its proposal (COM (2013)534 Commission 
proposal for a regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, 17.7.2013). 
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concerning improvements of Member StatesÕ administrative capacity.  Article 197(2) TFEU, 
which has thus far received relatively little attention in EU institutional practice and amongst 
academic legal commentators, states: 
 
 ÒArticle 197 TFEU 
 [É] 
 2. The Union may support the effort of Member States to improve their 
 administrative capacity to implement Union law. Such action may include facilitating 
 the exchange of information and of civil servants as well as supporting training 
 schemes. No Member State shall be obliged to avail itself of such support. The 
 European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance 
 with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the necessary measures to this 
 end, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.Ó 
 
Article 197(2) is complemented by Article 6(g) TFEU, which confirms that the Union has 
competence to carry out action in the field of administrative cooperation to support, 
coordinate or supplement the actions of Member States. Article 2(5) TFEU confirms that 
such supportive, complementary or supplementary competence does not supersede Member 
State competence (i.e., has no pre-emptive effect). This stands in contrast with areas of Union 
policy competence shared with Member States (such as environmental policy).129 The effect 
of Article 197(2) TFEU is to act as lex specialis to the general environmental treaty 
provisions set out in Articles 191-193 TFEU, so as to rule out the prospect of harmonized EU 
minimum standards regarding the administrative capacity of Member State national 
environmental protection authorities. The effect of Article 197(2) is to restrict the scope of 
Article 192 TFEU, which in light of CJEU case law might otherwise be construed as broad 
enough to provide a legal basis for measures intended to harmonise national rules on 
implementation which the EU legislature consider necessary to ensure the effectiveness of 
EU environmental protection rules.130 
 
																																																													
129 Art.4 (2)(e) TFEU. 
130 Notably, in its Environmental Crimes judgment (Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879), 
the CJEU confirmed that the predecessor to Article 192 TFEU (Article 175 EC) provided the EU legislature 
with a legal basis to introduce a directive on environmental crime with a view to ensuring the application of 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by competent national authorities, as a reflection of the 
EU legislatureÕs view that such an instrument constitutes an essential measure for combating serious 
environmental offences: see paragraph 48 of judgment in Case C-176/03. 
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At first glance it might seem that Article 197(2) TFEU raises a significant legal question 
mark concerning the legal validity of a Union legislative instrument seeking to harmonise 
standards on environmental inspections. It is important to bear in mind, though, that the 
material scope of this treaty provision covers only measures specifically addressing aspects 
concerning administrative capacity. Accordingly, the CJEU would likely regard as ultra vires 
legislative provisions in a Union environmental inspection directive stipulating minimum 
numbers of personnel, training schemes or communication equipment and networks to be 
used by national environmental inspection authorities on account of the harmonisation 
exclusion clause under Article 197(2).  However, legislative provisions stipulating minimum 
operational standards for environmental inspections are not caught by Article 197(2). A 
suitably narrow interpretation of the material coverage of Article 197(2) is supported when 
one considers its origins which may be traced back to the European Convention process that 
culminated ultimately in the drawing up of the failed 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe (TECE).131 Section 6 of Title III of Part III of the TECE contained an equivalent 
provision to Article 197(2) TFEU, namely Article III-185. Working Group V of the European 
Convention process leading up to the adoption of the TECE concerned itself with the area of 
Ôcomplementary competenciesÕ. In its final 2002 report132 to the Convention Secretariat the 
Working Group recommended that the Union be authorised to facilitate Ôexchange of 
information and persons related to administration of EU law and to support common training 
and development programmesÕ.133The final report also refers to a document134 of the 
Working Group containing the original proposal for the facilitation of administrative 
cooperation, which identifies  its aim as the provision Ôof a formal framework for Community 
actions aiming at further strengthening co-operation between and mobility among public 
administrations across the EU, and at stimulating exchanges and common activities on issues 
of common concern in the field of public administration, including common training and 
development activitiesÕ, whilst also Ômaking such actions more sustainable and enduring, as 
well as more transparent and publicÕ.135 These documents clarify that the intention behind the 
Working GroupÕs initiative on administrative co-operation was in essence to facilitate the 
development of administrative cooperation between national authorities through networks 
																																																													
131 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] OJ C310/1. 
132 CONV 375/1/02 REV 1 (WG V 14) Final Report of Working Group V to the European Convention, 
4.11.2002. 
133 See page 18, ibid. 
134 European Convention Working Group V (working document 21): Proposal by G. Druesne on a new article 
on Public Administration (4.9.2002). 
135 See page 4, ibid. 
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(such as the IMPEL network established amongst environmental authorities) and ensure that 
these would be established on a more formal and accountable footing. There is no evidence to 
suggest that the Member States came to change this purpose when deliberating over the terms 
of the TECE, although it is evident that they did agree to incorporate clauses ruling out 
harmonisation of such measures.  
 
Accordingly, whilst Article 197(2) TFEU serves to restrict the material scope of an EU 
environmental inspections instrument, the effect of the Ôno harmonisationÕ clause is by no 
means fatal to its promulgation.136  Introduction of Article 197(2) has raised the level of legal 
complexity in terms of identifying the boundaries of Union competence with respect to the 
area of national environmental inspections and appears to introduce a limitation of Union 
competence previously not identified as a priority concern in the particular policy field. Yet it 
would be an error to construe the purpose of Article 197(2) as being to secure the outright 
exclusion of Union measures intended to enhance the administrative capability of Member 
State authorities to secure delivery of EU policy decisions, including in the environmental 
sector. Indeed, Article 197(3) TFEU underpins the limited scope of Article 197(2) by 
emphasising that the treaty article is without prejudice to the obligations of Member States to 
implement Union law. There is no doubt, though, that the EU legislature will have to tread 
with some caution and comply with the requirements of Article 197(2) if presented with the 
opportunity to deliberate upon a legislative proposal concerning the general management of 
national environmental inspection systems to oversee compliance with EU environmental 
law. Furthermore, given its uncertain parameters, it is highly likely that Article 197(2) TFEU 
would become a bone of legal contention in judicial review proceedings before the CJEU if 
Union political institutions and Member States fall out over the contents of any future general 
horizontal EU legislative instrument intended to supersede the RMCEI. 
 
 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although the EU has managed to adopt a number of measures on environmental inspection 
management, it has so far not established a sufficiently coherent supranational federal 
																																																													
136 Schtze has cautioned that an ironic side-effect of this treaty provision may be to favour indirectly more 
centralized intervention by the EU through the conferral of implementing powers on the Commission or Council 
of the EU under the aegis of Article 291(2) TFEU (i.e. via ÔcomitologyÕ): R. Schtze  (2015) n.109 above at 
p339. In the context of EU environmental policy, though, such a development is unlikely given the long-
standing resistance and scepticism of several Member States to the idea of a strong level of supranational 
institutional engagement in implementation matters. 
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framework upon which to develop Union policy in this area. Whilst a number of key 
environmental sectors have not yet been made subject to minimum Union standards 
concerning inspection management (e.g. water, nature protection, air quality), the existing 
range of Union legislative provision on environmental inspections appears to have developed 
with little regard for consistency. The process for developing a viable general framework 
instrument has so far proved to be a tortuous process. The RMCEI is not fit for purpose, 
being neither legally binding nor adequately broad in material scope. It remains unclear when 
a successor measure will proposed, notwithstanding the adoption of a clear political mandate 
for legislative revision by the EAP7.  As a consequence of widespread Member State 
scepticism of moves to construct a broad and effective supranational framework on 
environmental inspections, a view which appears also to resonate with the current European 
Commission college (2014-2019), Union policy on environmental inspections has remained 
to date incremental, unpredictable and uncoordinated. 
 
The slow progress made by the Union towards a more effective system of shared 
management between EU federal and Member State levels over inspections is reflective of 
the unclear and unsettled position of the EU on the issue of balance of power and 
responsibilities between each level of governance operating across the Union. In essence, the 
Union remains subject to contradictory influences regarding the question of federal 
involvement in oversight and control of administration of inspection systems. On the one 
hand, the poor record of implementation of EU environmental obligations has to some extent 
strengthened the hand of those questioning the credibility of continuing with the traditional 
model of Ôindirect administrationÕ which favours a predominance of Member State 
administrative autonomy. Such questioning has emanated notably from the CommissionÕs 
Environment Directorate General as well as the European Parliament. The Lisbon Treaty has 
also underpinned the legitimacy of a role for the Union to concern itself with implementation 
matters in the form of Article 197(1) TFEU, in confirming that Member State implementation 
is to be regard as a Ômatter of common interestÕ and Ôessential for the proper functioning of 
the UnionÕ. On the other hand, countervailing political and constitutional dynamics within the 
Union continue to offer considerable resistance against increases in supranational 
engagement in policy. Political resistance is given expression in the form of Member State 
representation in the Council of the EU. Constitutional resistance is expressed in the form of 
Union treaty provisions on subsidiarity guarantees and an exclusion of harmonisation 
regarding the area of national administrative capacity under Article 197(2) TFEU.  With these 
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conflicting forces in play, it is unsurprising that it remains problematic for headway to be 
made over future development of EU policy on environmental inspections management. In 
the absence of a clear(er) resolution of how federal and statal roles should be defined, it is 
likely that the Union will be unable to achieve a genuinely integrated and effective form of 
shared administration within the European administrative space as far as environmental 
inspection management is concerned. Moreover, unless the Union establishes a more 
coherent supranational framework on environmental inspections, it is difficult to see how 
significant progress will be achieved in addressing the current poor state of implementation 
of EU environmental law.  
 
